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[Sac. No. 7841. In Bank. Mar. 28, 1969.] 
GLENN R. SEWELL SHEET METAL, INC., et al., Plain-
tiffs, Cross-defendants and Appellants, v. NICK LO-
VERDE et al., Defendants, Cross-complainants and 
Appellants; BERTHA A. MILLER et al., Cross-com-
plainants, Cross-defendants and Respondents. 
[1] Landlord and Tenant-Possession and Use of Premises-Land-
lord's Duty to Make Repairs.-No general public policy re-
quires that private property and the improvements thereon 
be maintained in good condition at all times, and a private 
property owner is under no general duty to correct defective - - --. ! 
conditions; the fact that he leases the premises to another 
does not alter the rule. 
[2] Id. - Possession and Use of Premises - Duty of Tenant to 
Make Repairs.-A lessee is under no general duty to correct 
defective conditions on the leased premises except when .nec-
essary to prevent waste or to rectify dilapidations cause?! by 
his own lack of ordinary care. 
[3] Id.-Possession and Use of Premise~Landlord's and Ten-
ant's Duties to Make Repairs.-Wben preventative or repara-
tive actions are required by laws and orders governing leased 
[3] Who, as between landlord and tenant, must make, or bear 
expense of, alterations, improvements, or repairs ordered by 
public authorities. note, 22 A.L.R.3d 521. See also Oal.Jur.2d, Land-
lord and Tenant, § 133 et seq; Am.Jur., Landlord and Tenant (1st 
ed § 661, 786). 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Landlord and Tenant, §119; [2,4,5] 
Landlord and Tenant, § 122; [3] LancUord and Tenant, §§ 119, 122; 
f6] Landlord Bud Tenant, § 123(1); [7, 8] Landlord and Tenant, 
§ 123(3); [9] Landlord and Tenant, § 197(2); [10, 11] L~ndlord 
and Tenant, § 197(3). 
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premises and their uses, public policy requires that someone 
at all times be obliged to comply with such laws and orders, 
and parties to n lease will not be permitted to create a hiatus 
in their respective duties of compliance; one or more of the 
parties interested in the property must be obliged to comply 
with some or all of the laws and orders affecting the premises, 
and the lessor remains subject to that duty unless it is assumed 
by the lessee. 
[4] Id.-Possession and Use of Premises-Duty of Tenant to Make 
Bepairs.-A lessee who voluntarily puts the premises to uses 
different from those to which they were put before the creation 
of his tenancy, and thereby causes the premises to fall within 
. the scope of existing laws not previously applicable to the 
premises, must bear the burden of conforming his new use to 
the requirements of the law and of taking all action necessary 
to rectify any subsequent instances of noncompliance. 
[6] Id.-Possession and Use of Premises-Duty of Tenant to Make 
Bepairs.-The lessees had the initial duty to make their new 
use ~eased premises conform to all laws and orders applic-
able to a; trailer park and to comply with laws governing the 
septic system that they installed thereon, where the lessors 
permitted them to make whatever use they wished of the 
premises, and where the lessee ceased to use the premises for 
automobile'repairs and converted them to a trailer park. 
[6] Id.-Possession and Use of Premises-Repairs, Alterations, 
and Improvements-Oovenants.-A lessor .is free to transfer 
his obligations to comply with laws and orders regulating the 
use of the leased premises to his lessee by an agreement in 
which the lessee assumes the duty of compliance and the risk 
that the performance of such duty may prove expensive or 
inconvenient. 
[7] Id. - Possession a.nd Use of Premises - Repairs, Alterations 
and Improvements-Oovenants of 'l'enant.-A lessee's unquali-
fied covenant to comply with applicable laws, standing alone, 
does not constitute an assumption of the duty to comply with 
those laws that require curative actions of a "substantial" 
nature. 
[8] Id.-Possession and Use of Premises-Repairs, Alterations 
and Improvements - Oovenants of Tenant. - A sublessee of 
premises used as a trailer park assumed the risk of conforming 
the sewer system to existing government requirements upon 
foreseeable failure of a known septic system thereon, where 
he covenanted to comply with all applicable laws and repre-
[7] See Oal.Jur;2d, Landlord and Tenant, § 65; Am.Jur., Land-
lord and Tenant (1st ed § 788 et seq). 
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sen ted that he had examined the premises and knew their 
condition, that the sublessors had made no representation as 
to their condition, and that the sublessors were relieved of all 
obligations as to repairs or maintenance of improvements 
which 8ubles80rs also disclaimed; where the sublessee agreed 
to assume all risk of loss and to indemnify the sublessor for 
expense and damage caused by his use of the premises, one 
source of which might be illegal unsanitary conditions thereof; 
and where the character of the premises and its primary use 
as a trailer park, the principal features of which were ground 
space and water, utility and sewer facilities, indicated that 
the sublessee must have known that the laws respecting such 
facilities would be of primary importance and obviously in-
cluded in the lease clause requiring his compliance 'with all 
applicable laws. 
[9] Id.-Termination-Frustration of Purpose.-A sublessee, upon 
failure of a septic system on the leased premises used as & 
trailer park, could not avail himself of the common law doc-
trine of frustration, or the doctrine relating to the destruction 
of the subject matter of a hiring as codified in Civ. Code, 
§ 1932, subd. 2, where he voluntarily assumed the duty of 
compliance with all laws respecting the premises which in-
cluded the obligation either to connect the sewer system to & 
public sewer or to cease using the premises as a trailer park 
upon failure of the septic system. 
[10] Id.-Termination-Frustration of Purpose-Governmental 
Intervention.-The rule that if parties have contracted with 
reference to a frustrating event or have contemplated the risks 
arising from it, they may not invoke the doctrine of frustration 
to escape their obligations, applies also to Civ. Code, § 1932, 
subd. 2, relating to the destruction of the subject matter of a 
hiring; thus a sublessee could not terminate his sublease or 
have it declared unenforceable and recover a deposit thereon 
whether the perishment required by Civ. Code, § 1932, was the 
failure of a cesspool on the premises used as a trailer park, or 
the consequent termination of the trailer park operations pur-
suant to governmental order, where he had assumed the risk 
of both occurrences. 
[11] Id.-Termination-Frustration of Purpose-Governmental 
Intervention.-A lessee cannot terminate a lease because 'of 
the destruction of the subject matter where he has assumed 
the risks involved by his covenants relieving his lessor of all 
duties of repair and maintenance and undertaking for himself 
the duty to comply with all laws and orders respecting the 
premises. 
[9] See Cal.Jur.2d, Landlord and Tenant, § 251. 
) 
I 
Mar. 1969] GLENN R. SEWELL SHEET METAL, 
INC. 11. LOVERDE 
['10 C.2d 866; '15 Cal.Rptr. 889. til P.2d '121) 
669 
APPEALS from judgment of the Superior Court of Sacra-
mento County. William A. White, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action in declaratory relief to declare a sublease unenforce-
able and to recover a rental deposit; cross-actions by lessee 
against sublessee for enforcement and against owner for 
release from terms of lease and by owner against lessee to 
enforce lease and to recover unpaid rent. Judgment against 
plaintiffs enforcing sublease and for owner enforcing lease 
affirmed. . 
Miller, Ford & 0 'Neal and Charles J. Miller for Plaintiffs, 
Cross-defendants and Appellants. 
Pierce Deasy for Defendants, Cross-complainants and Ap-
pellants. 
~, Carr & Anderson for Cross-complainants, Cross-
defendaDts and Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Plaintiffs and cross-defendants Glenn 
R. Sewell Sheet Metal, Inc., and Glenn R. Sewell appeal from 
nn adverse judgment in their action for declaratory relief 
against defendants and cross-complainants Nick and Ellen 
Loverde, Sewell's sublessors, to declare Sewell's sublease 
unenforcible and to recover a $3,000 deposit. The Loverdes 
cross-complained against cross-defendants and cross-complain-
ants Bertha A. Miller, also known as Bertha A. Perkins, and 
Thomas C. Perkins alleging that if the Sewell-Loverde sub-
lease is unenforcible the Loverdes' lease with the Perkinses is 
liltewise unenforcible. 
This controversy arises out of the abandonment by Sewell 
of premises leased to the Loverdes and subleased to Sewell. 
The abandonment occurred when a septic system on the prem-
ises failed, precluding further use of the premises as a trailer 
court unless adequate sewer connections were made. 
On September 1, 1948, the Perkinses leased a parcel of land 
to Howard and Evelyn McCrum for a 10-year term with an 
option to renew for five years. The premises included a house 
and a store. The house was to be used as a home; the rest of 
the premises could be used only for retail store, restaurant, or 
agricultural uses. The lessees covenanted to maintain the prem-
ises in as good or better condition than they were in at the 
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On August 13, 1951, with the approval of the Perkinses, the 
McCrums assigned the lease to the Loverdes, who assumed the 
covenants therein. On September 1, 1958, the Loverdes exer-
cised their option to extend the lease to 1963. At the same 
time the lease was modified to grant the Loverdes another 
option to renew for an additional three years, i.e., until 
August 31, 1966, and to remove all restrictions on the use of 
the premises thus permitting the Loverdes to continue using 
the premises for an auto repair business, a use not within the 
original permitted uses. 
On 1t'Iay 6, 1963, Sewell, who had previously subleased the 
store building for use in his sheet-metal business, subleased 
the entire premises from the Loverdes for the period of the 
additional three-year option (1963-1966). At that time the 
Loverdes were using the premises as a trailer park for which 
they had previously installed the necessary improvements, 
including the septic system involved in this action. 
Sewell successfully operated the premises as a trailer park 
until sometime after September 1964, when difficulties arose 
with the septic system. Sewell spent some $3,500 to alleviate 
the reSUlting pooling of effluent on the grounds, but was 
unable to rectify the defect. On September 16, 1965, the Sac-
ramento County Department of Public Health ordered Sewell 
to connect the trailer park sewage system to nearby public 
sewer lines or to terminate the use of the premises as a trailer 
park.l After determining that the required connection would 
cost approximately $7,500, and that neither the Perkinses nor 
the Loverdes were willing to pay for the connection, Sewell 
elected to terminate his operation of the trailer park and 
ordered the occupants to leave. After unsuccessfully attempt-
ing to negotiate a return to his sublease of the store alone, 
Sewell abandoned the premises 11 months before the termina-
tion date of the sublease and paid no rent for that period. 
lThe Department of Public Health invoked Health and Safety Code 
!;cction 18377 and Sacramento County Ordinance No. 378 in support of 
its order. Section 18377 had previously been in force as sections 18378 
(1955-1961) and 18683 (1941-1955) Health and Safety Code, respec-
tively. Section 18377, as amended by Statutes 1965, chapter 1510, page 
;3552, section 25, i~ now section 180:'34, IIealth and Safety Code. Tho 
section in its various forms, has always prohibited the deposition of 
trailer effluent upon the ground. Sacramento County Ordinance No. 378, 
lmacted October 3, 1950, regulates the operation of sewage disposal-
systems in uninco1'llorated areas of Sacramento County. The foregoing 
laws were in effect before the assignment of the master lease to the 
Loverdes and at all times thereafter. The validity of the action of the 
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Sewell contends that he was justified in abandoning the prem-
ises and that he therefore owes no rent and is entitled to the 
return of $3,000 he paid in advance.2 
The question presented is which party had the duty under 
the terms of the lease and sublease and the applicable law to 
comply with governmental laws and orders governing the use 
of the ·premises. " 
At the outset we distinguish two similar but unrelated 
duties that often overlap and may create unnecessary confu-
sion. The first, not directly involved in this case, is the duty to 
repair or maintain the premises in the absence of special la"ws 
or governmental orders. [1] Since no general public policy 
requires that private property and the improvements thereon 
be maintained in good condition at all times, a private prop-
~ owner is under no general duty to correct defective con-
~ti0fS's and the fact that he leases the premises to another 
does not alter the rule. (Cowell v. Lumley (1870) 39 Cal. 151, 
153 [2 Am.Rep. 430] ; Strecker v. Barnard (1952) 109 Cal. 
App.2d 149, 152 [240 P.2d 345] and cases cited).4 [2] Sim-
ilarly a lessee is under no general duty to correct defec-
tive conditions on the leased premises except when necessary 
to prevent waste or to rectify dilapidations caused by his own 
lack of ordinary care. (Civ. Code, §§ 1928, 1929; 1 American 
Law of Property (A. J. Casner ed. 1952) § 3.78, pp. 346-348.,)5 
Thus, with regard to the duty to repair or maintain, many 
dilapidations may go unrectified, neither the lessor nor the 
lessee having a duty to ameliorate the condition, but each 
having assumed the risk that the dilapidation will decrease 
the use or value of his interest: (Western Motors Servicing 
2Until his abandonment, Sewell paid all rent as it came due, including 
the full rental for the first six months, even though he had made a 
.3,000 advance payment to cover part of that rent. His rent for the 
entire premises was .725 per month, representing the $500 per month 
pwing from the Loverdes to the Perkinses plus an additional $225 per 
month. When he had subleased the store building alone his rent had been 
$140 per month. 
SHe may not, however, allow property under his control to become a 
nuisance and, if he permits others to come upon the property, he may be 
required to maintain the property in a safe condition. (See 2 Witkhl, 
Summary of Cal. Law (7th cd. 1960) pp. 1440·1472.) 
"Specific preventative or reparative duties may of course be imposed 
by statute (e.g., Civ. Code, § 1941) or special circumstances (see, e.~., 
Jano!s"ky v. Garland (1941) 42 Cal.App.2d 6:')5, 657 [109 P.2d 750]; 
Rest., Torts, § 362) or may be created by agreement between the parties. 
tiThe lessee may assume further duties by agreement and, in special 
circumstances, additional duties may be imposed by law. (See fn. 3, 
inlra.) 
I 
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Corp. v. Land Dcv. & Inv. Co. (1957) 152 Cal.App.2d 509, 513 
[313 P.2d 927].) 
[3] A different conclusion must be reached however, when· 
preventative or reparative actions are required by laws and 
orders governing the premises and their uses. In such a case 
public policy requires that someone at all times be obliged to 
comply with such laws and orders, and parties to a lease will 
not be pennitted to create a hiatus in their respective duties 
of compliance. One or more of the parties interested in the 
property must therefore be obliged to comply with some or all 
of the laws and orders affecting the premises. Since the prop-
erty owner is initially under the duty to comply with all laws 
and orders, he, as lessor, remains subject to that duty unless it 
is assumed by the lessee. (1 American Law of Property, 
supra, § 3.80, pp. 353-355; 2 Walsh, Commentaries on the 
Law of Real Property (1947) § 165, pp. 232-233. Cases on the 
allocation between a lessor and lessee of the duty to comply 
with applicable laws are collected in Annot. (1924) 33 A.L.R. 
530-541 and Annot. (1968) 22 A.L.R.3d 521, 555.) 
There are three ways in which a lessee may obligate himself 
to comply with laws and orders. One is unrelated to this 
case;6 the other two will be discussed in the order in which. 
they arose in the transactions before us. 
[4] A lessee who voluntarily puts the premises to uses 
different from those to which they were put before the crea-
tion of his tenancy, and thereby causes the premises to fall 
within the scope of existing lawsT not previously applicable to 
the premises, must bear the burden of conforming his new use 
to the requirements of the law and of taking all action neces-
sary to rectify any subsequent instances of noncompliance. 
This rule applies whether the lessee's obligation is viewed as 
arising from an implied assumption of the lessor's initial 
6In some states, including California, the creation of the lessor-lessee 
relationship itself imposes upon tho lessee a minimal duty of compliance 
with applicable laws. Such a duty extends only to those required activities 
that are truly minor in expense and inconvenience, that arise out of the 
ordinary course of the lessee's use of the premises, and that would in no 
event impose upon the lessee a burden greatel' than that imposed by the 
common law duty to prevent waste. (See Wall Estate Co. v. Standard 
Box Co. (1912) 20 Cal.App. 311 [128 P. 1020] [modernization of toilets 
in a factory1: Finnegan v. Royal Realty Co. (1950) 35 Ca1.2d 409, 432 
[218 P.2d 17] findicating that the duty does not extend to activities 
that create" permanent" improvements or yield a If substantial benedt" 
to the reversion].) -
7We need not consider the question whether it is the lessee's or the 
lessor's duty to comply with a new law passed atter the lestlee haa under-
taken a new use of the premises. 
-.. 
) 
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duty not to alter the use of the premises under his control 
without complying with all applicable laws (see Pross v. 
Excelsior Cleaning d7 Dyeing Co. (1919) 110 Misc. 195 [179 
N.Y.S, 176, 180] (dicta); Clarke v. Yukon Inv. Co. (1915) 83 
Wash. 485 [145 P. 624, 627, Ann. Cas. 1916E 625] (dicta)). 
or whether it is viewed as reflecting -an independent duty to 
comply with the particular laws made applicable by the 
Jessee's new use of the premises. (See MulUgan v. Fioravera 
(1930) 228 App.Div. 270 [239 N.Y.S. 438, 442] (dicta); 
Johnson v. Snow (1903) 102 Mo.App. 233 [76 S.W. 675, 677] 
(dicta), revd. on other grounds, 201 Mo. 450 [100 S.W. 5] 
(1907).) Under either theory the reason for imposing the 
duty on the lessee remains the same. If he were free to modify 
the use of the premises as he wished8 and did not by such 
.JIl.04ification assume the duty to comply with applicable laws, 
he ",ould have the lessor at his mercy. "[A] landlord might 
be called upon to meet the cost of fire escapes, if the lessee 
decided to open a rooming house. If that use proved unprofit-
able, the tenant might use the property as a theatre . . . and 
the landlord would be compelled to provide -such additional 
exits aitd escapes [as required by law], or, that venture fail-
ing, he might be called upon to meet the expenses of adapting 
the premises to the [governmental] requirements of a restaur-
ant, if the lessee willed to engage in it." (Clarke v. Yukon 
Inv. Co., supra, 145 P. 624, 625.) [6] It would be inequit-
able to impose such a burden upon the Perkinses in this case. 
They permitted the Loverdes to make whatever use of the 
premises the Loverdes wished. When the Loverdes ceased to 
use the premises for automobile repairs and converted them to 
a trailer park, the duty became theirs to make the new use 
conform to all laws and orders applicable to a trailer park. 
They therefore had the initial duty to comply with laws 
governing the septic system that they had installed. 
We turn to the relation between the Loverdes and Sewell 
who, as between themselves, were lessor and lessee respec-
tively. Since Sewell did not change the Loverdes' use of the 
premises as a trailer park, no assumption of the duty to comply 
with the laws applicable to that use arose under tIle rule 
. discussed above. [6] A lessor is free, however, to transfer 
8We do not consider the application of the foregoing rule to those 
situations where the lease restricts the use of the premises, nor those 
where the lessor has a direct interest in the specific use to which the 
lcssee puts the premises (e.g., where the rent is related to the profits to 
be derived from the leesee'. use). 
70 C.Jd--= 
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his obligations to his lessce by an agreement in which the 
lessee assumes the duty of compliance and the risk that the 
performance of such duty may prove expensive or incon-i 
venient. ~ 
We must therefore interpret the terms of Sewell's subleaseD I 
to determine whether he assumed that duty and risk. (Civ. 
Code, §§ 1635-1657; Realty &- Rebuilding Co. v. Rea (1920) 
184 Cal. 565, 575-576 [194 P. 1024].) Under paragraph D of 
the sublease, Sewell agreed to comply with "requirements of 
applicable federal, state, county, city and district laws, ordi-' 
nances, rules and regulations. . . ." [1] Although this 
general covenant literally applies to the order of the Sacra-
mento County Departmcnt of Public Health that public sewer 
connections be made or the trailer park operations be termi-
nated, the general rule is that a lessee's unqualified covenant 
to comply with applicable laws, standing alone, does not con-
stitute an assumption of the duty to comply wit~ those laws 
- that require curative actions of a "substantial" nature.tO 
9The relevant provisions of the sublease are: /" 
"(D) Sub-lessee is conversant with all of the terms of the basic lease 
and the modification thereof and he agrees that he will occupy and di(14 
pose the leasehold estate in a manner commensurate with the require-' 
ments and limitations imposed by said basic lease and by the require-
ments of applicable, federal, stnte, county, city and district laws, ordi-
nances, rules and regulations pertaining to any and all segments of the 
operations and uses to which the property may be subjected or put. 
"(E) 'fhat the Sub· lessee has examined a~d knows the condition of 
said premises, and that no representations as to the- condition or repair 
thereof have been made by the Sub-lessors, prior to, or at the execution 
of this lease, that are not herein expressed or endorsed hereon. 
"(F) Sub-lessors shall be under no obligation hereunder for the repair 
or maintenance of any of the improvements upon said demised premises. 
"(1) Sub-lessee assumes all risk of loss by reason of injury or damage 
to person or property occasioned in consequence of the use and occupation 
of said premises by Sub-lessee and Sub-lessee does hereby specifically._ 
agree to indemnify Sub-lessors from and against all manner of claims, 
cost, expense or damage in consequence of the use and occupation of such 
property .•.. " 
10See : Annot., supra, 22 A.L.R.3d 521, sections 6-12, pages 529-555; 
Annat., supra, 33 A.L.R. 5:JO, sections II, III, pages 530·541. Compare 
Strecker v. Barnard (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 149 [240 P.2d 345], with 
Browning v. Aymard (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 277 [36 Cal.Rptr. 604]. See 
also, 1 American Law of Property, 81tpra, section 3.80, pages 353-355. 
This rule also applies to covenants to repair or maintain. The labels 
"substantial" and "non-substantial" are obviously conclusory; they 
reflect a court 'H determination whether or not the parties to a lease agreed 
that the lessee nl'lliumcd certain riskR, despite the use of unqualified lan-
guage. The courts occasionally indicate the factors that offer insight 
into the probable intcnt of the parties such as: (1) the relationship of 
the cost of the curative action to the rent reserved, (2) the term for. 
which the lease was made, (3) the relationship of the benefit to the lessee 










Mar. 1969] GLENN R. SEWELL SHEET METAL, 
INC. v. LOVERDE 
[70 C.2d 666; 75 Cal.Rptr. 889, 451 P.2d 7211 
675 
Sewell's general covenant to comply does not, however, 
stand alone. Even if the sewer connections were classified as 
"substantial" within the meaning of the foregoing rule, provi-
sions of the sublease other than paragraph D make it clear 
that Sewell assumed the duty to comply with the order in 
question. 
[8] Sewell not only covenanted to comply with all applic-
able laws, but represented, in paragraphs E and F, that he 
had examined the premises and knew of their condition, that 
the Loverdes had made no representation as to their condi-
tion, and that the Loverdes were relieved of all obligations as 
to the repair or maintenance of the improvements thereon. In 
the absence of a covenant by the Loverdes to repair or main-
tain the improvements, their only obligation in this respect 
w~arise from the duty to comply with applicable laws.ll 
Under I these circumstances the Loverdes' disclaimer of any 
obligation at all under paragraphs E and F can be given 
effect only by interpreting them to relieve the I.JOverdes of any 
duty to take those "substantial" curative actions required by 
law that the language of paragraph D alone would not cover. 
(See Rose v. Long (1954) 128 Cal.App.2d 824 [275 P.2d 
925].) Moreover, in paragraph I Sewell agreed to assume all 
risk of loss by reason of damage to person or property, and to 
indemnify the Loverdes for all expense and damage, caused 
by Sewell's use of the premises. One source of such liability 
to third parties would be illegal unsanitary conditions on the 
premises, and it would be contradictory to hold that the 
Loverdes remained responsible for the" substantial" curative 
actions necessary to preclude or alleviate such conditions but 
that Sewell was to assume all risk of loss of, and to indemnify 
the Loverdes for any liability arising from, the Loverdes' 
breach of that duty . 
.Any doubt that might persist that Sewell assumed the risk 
of conforming the sewer system to the governmental require-
ments is dispelled by a consideration of the character of the 
premises involved. The primary use of the premises was for a 
trailer park, the principal features of which are the ground 
space and pads upon which the trailers rest, and the water, 
or non-structural in nature, (5) the degree to which the lessee's enjoy-
ment of the premises will be interfered with while the curative action is 
being undertaken, and (6) rin cases involving compliance with laws or 
orders] the likelihood that the parties contemplated the application of 
the particular law or order involved. 
llSee text accompanying footnotes 3 and 4, infra. 
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utility, and sewer facilities to which the trailers connect. 
Accordingly, one who intends to operate a trailer park must 
know that laws respecting and regulating such facilities would 
be of primary importance to him and would be those most 
obviously included in a clause requiring compliance with all 
applicable laws. 
Sewell knew that adequate sewage disposal was essential, 
and he testified that he assumed that the sewer system was not 
connected to the public sewer. He knew or should have known 
that cesspool systems do not last forever and that when the 
septic system failed public sewer connections would be 
required.12 He took the premises ' , as is,' , relieved the 
Loverdes of the duty to repair or maintain the improvements, 
agreed to indemnify them for any liability arising out of his 
use of the premises, and assumed the duty of compliance with 
all laws respecting the premises. [9] Under all the circum-
stances Sewell's covenant to comply included the obligation 
either to connect the sewer system to a public sewer or to 
cease using the premises as a trailer park. Accordingly, he 
assumed the risk that such compliance might interfere with 
his use of the premises or render it less profitable. 
Having voluntarily assumed this duty aud its attendant 
risk, Sewell may not avail himself of either the common law 
doctrine of frustration, or the doctrine relating to the de-
struction of the subject matter of a hiring as codified in Civil 
Code section 1932, subdivision 2. 
[10] "It is settled that if parties have contracted with 
reference [to the frustrating event] or have contemplated the 
risks arising from it, they may not invoke the doctrine of 
frustration to escape their obligations." (Lloyd v. Murphy 
(1944) 25 Ca1.2d 48, 55 [153 P.2d 47] ; see Gold v. Salem 
Lutheran Home Assn. (1959) 53 Ca1.2d 289, 291 [1 Cal.Rptr. 
343, 347 P.2d 687] .)18 The foregoing principle is not limited 
12The laws here involved had been in effect long before this sublease 
was made. (See fn. 2 in/ra.) Parties to an agreement are presumed to 
have contemplated the laws and ordinances relating to the agreement. 
(Brown v. Kling (1894) 101 Cal. 295, 299 [35 P. 995]; Monson v. 
Fischer (1931) 118 Cal.App. 503, 516 [5 P.2d 6281.) 
13The doctrine of frustration as applied by courts in the United States 
originated in England at the turn of the century. (Krell v. Henry [1903] 
!! K.B. 740 [C.A.J: Blakely v. Muner, 19 T.L.R. 186 [K.B.].) It is the 
most broadly stated of the discharge of duty doctrines and may, in conse-
quence. appear to overlap other such doctrines: e.~.. "Impossibility of 
Performance" (Civ. Code, § 1511; see 6 Williston, Contracts, § 1935, 
pp. 5418·5429: Lloyd v. Murphy, s'upra; Rest., Contracts, ch. 14, pp. 843-
889); "Mistake" (Civ. Code, § 1689; Bank Line Ltd. v. Arthur Chapel 
) 
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to the doctrine of frustration. (See e.g., McLarren v. Spald-
ing (1852) 2 Cal. 510, 514.) It applies also to subdivision 2 of 
section 1932 of the Civil Code.14 'Vhcther the perishment 
required by section 1932 was the failure of the cesspool or the 
consequent termination of the trailer park operations pursuant 
4' Co. [1919] A.C. 435, 444-445; "Destruction of Subject Matter" (Civ. 
Code, U 1932, 1933, discussed infra.) It is, however, a separate doctrine. 
Despite the broad spectrum of rationales for and parameters of the 
frustration doctrine that have been utilized or proposed, the rule quoted 
above from Lloyd v. Murphy applies to all such combinations. (See, the 
surveys of "frustration' 1 doctrines contained in Smit, Frustration of 
Contract: A Comparative Attempt at Con.aoZidation (1958) 58 Colum.L. 
Rev. 287 (civil law) and Note (1960) 59 Mich.L.Rev. 98 (common law) ; 
see also, Farnsworth, Disputes Over Omission in Contracts (1968) 68 Colum. 
L.Rev. 860; Annot. (1962) 84 A.L.R.2d 12; 20th Century Lites, Inc. v. 
Goodman (1944) 64 Ca1.App.2d Supp. 938, 944 [14!l P.2d 88] [doctrine W. on implied condition] and Dorn v. Goetz (1948) 85 Cal.App.2d 407, 411 193 P.2d 121] [doctrine based on failure of consideration].) The 
rule applies whether or not the doctrine itself contains a specific require-
ment of nonforeseeability. (Compare Rest., Contracts, § 288 and comment b 
with U.C.C., § 2-615 and comment 1 rCom. Code, 12615]; see 20th 
Oentury Lites, Inc. v. Goodman, supra.) The soundness of this conclusion 
is apparent when it is realized tbat the question whether a risk was fore-
seeable is quite distinct from the question whether it was contemplated 
by the parties. It is possible for the parties to contemplate and make 
express provision for, a risk that would not otherwise be considered fore-
seeable. Conversely, some risks may be so wholly foreseeable that it would 
strain credulity to believe that they were not contemplated by the parties. 
(See Lloyd v. Murphy, 8'Upra.) Finally, the parties may have contem-
plated and expressly provided for a type of risk that in fact occurs, but 
the magnitUde or duration of which is so great that it cannot fairly be 
said to have been either contemplated or foreseeable. (See, Annot. (1942) 
137 A.L.R. 1199, 1239-1255 and cases cited.) When a risk has been 
contemplated and voluntarily assumed, however, and the manner of its 
occurrence is not so extraordinary as to justify the invocation of the last 
stated rule, foreseeability is not an issue and the parties will be held to 
the bargain they made. 
14Section 1932 provides: "The hirer of a thing may terminate the hir-
ing before the end of the term agreed upon: • • • . 2. When the greater 
part of the thing hired, or that part which was and which the letter had 
at the time of the hiring reason to believe was the material inducement to 
the hirer to enter into the contract, perishes from any other cause than 
the want of ordinary care of the hirer." 
Although section 1932, subdivision 2 apparently codifies the civil law 
doctrine regarding the destruction of the subject matter of a contract 
(see the annotations of Messrs. Haymond and Burch, members of the 
California Code Commission, to § 1932, Civ. Code of 1872, citing Edwards, 
Bailments pp. 331·338 and Story, Bailments, §§ 418·420 which discuss 
the civil law), a similar doctrine had earlier developed in this state as a 
principle of common law. (Ainsworth v. Ritt (1869) 38 Cal. 89, 90.) 
Although the doctrine of fnlstration might, in the absence of section 
1932, apply to situations eovered by that section, the section neither limits 
the frustration doctrine nor codifies its principles. The two doctrines are 
distinguished in 6 Corbin, Contracts (rev. ed. 1938) seetions 1334-1342 
and 1353·1361; 6 Williston, Contracts (rev. ed. 1938) section 1935, sub-
divisions (3) and (5). 




to governmental order, Sewell canDot prevail, for he asSumed 
the risk of both occurrences. [11] Both before (Ainsworth. v. 
Ritt, supra, 38 Cal. 89, 90) and after (Egan v. Dodd (1917) 
32 Cal.App. 706, 710-711 [164 P. 17], cf. Realty d Rebuilding 
Co. v. Rea, supra, 184 Cal. 565, 574-576) the enactment of 
section 1932, it was recognized that a party could not termi-
nate a lease because of the destruction of the subject matter 
'when he had assumed the risk of such destruction by his 
covenants to repair since to do so would be to evade one of the 
essential elements of the risk allocation intended by the 
parties' agreement. The result must be the same when the 
lessee has assumed the risk involved by his covenants relieving 
bis lessor of all duties of repair and maintenance and· under-
taking for himself the duty to comply with all laws and 
orders respecting the premises. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J., 
and Sullivan, J., concurred. 
